Salesforce Data Exfiltration

Campaign overview

MITRE ATT&CK historical record. Dates reflect source observations. Current activity and target-region classification are not asserted; Global denotes unclassified catalogue coverage. The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

This is a historical record and does not establish current campaign activity.

Threat actor

Not established

Attribution confidence

Not established

First documented activity

2024-10-01

End date

Not established

Estimated victims

Not established

Reported impact

Not established

Unknown attribution, confidence and impact remain unspecified. Regional labels can include unspecified targets; assess the source evidence before acting.

Documented timeline

1. 2024-10-01

   Source-reported first observation; not a claim of current activity or confirmed campaign start/end.

   Source: MITRE ATT&CK

2. 2025-09-01

   Source-reported last observation; not a claim of current activity or confirmed campaign start/end.

   Source: MITRE ATT&CK

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

• T1684.001 · Impersonation

  Stealth — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors impersonated IT support personnel in voice calls with victims at times claiming to be addressing enterprise-wide connectivity issues.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)

• T1608.005 · Link Target

  Resource Development — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors established an Okta phishing panel which victims were tricked into accessing from mobile phones or work computers during social engineering calls.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1059.006 · Python

  Execution — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used custom applications developed in python.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1213.004 · Customer Relationship Management Software

  Collection — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors accessed and exfiltrated sensitive information from compromised Salesforce instances.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1671 · Cloud Application Integration

  Persistence — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors deceived victims into authorizing malicious connected apps to their organization's Salesforce portal.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1078.002 · Domain Accounts

  Stealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised credentials for lateral movement.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1567 · Exfiltration Over Web Service

  Exfiltration — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors exfiltrated data via legitimate Salesforce API communication channels including the Salesforce Data Loader application.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)

• T1036 · Masquerading

  Stealth — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1090 · Proxy

  Command And Control — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Mullvad VPN IPs to proxy voice phishing calls.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1585.002 · Email Accounts

  Resource Development — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors registered emails shinycorp@tuta[.]com and shinygroup@tuta[.]com to send victims extortion demands.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1083 · File and Directory Discovery

  Discovery — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors queried customers' Salesforce environments to identify sensitive information for exfiltration.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)

• T1090.003 · Multi-hop Proxy

  Command And Control — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Tor IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1585 · Establish Accounts

  Resource Development — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created Salesforce trial accounts to register their malicious applications.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1587.001 · Malware

  Resource Development — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created malicious applications within Salesforce trial accounts, typically Python scripts with similar function to the Salesforce Data Loader.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1588.002 · Tool

  Resource Development — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initially relied on the legitimate Salesforce Data Loader app for data exfiltration.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)

• T1020 · Automated Exfiltration

  Exfiltration — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used API queries to automatically exfiltrate large volumes of data.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)

• T1586.002 · Email Accounts

  Resource Development — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised emails to create Salesforce trial accounts.(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

• T1598.004 · Spearphishing Voice

  Reconnaissance — During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initiated voice calls with victims to socially engineer them into authorizing malicious applications or divulging sensitive credentials.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)

Linked indicators

0 reviewed indicators. An indicator’s presence does not establish that every resource on shared infrastructure is malicious.

No reviewed indicators are supplied. None are inferred from the campaign description.

Documented infrastructure

No reviewed infrastructure is supplied.

Sources and evidence

• MITRE ATT&CK C0059

  Official MITRE ATT&CK campaign record C0059. Derived from mitre/cti commit 50be388e93819a5d20e71cbaaeccfda157abc846. Actor links and technique mappings are attributed to this source; confidence, victims, monetary impact and infrastructure are not inferred.

External sources retain their own licences and sharing conditions. Request a correction with supporting evidence.