Reviewed campaign intelligence
ShadowRay
Historical · OTHER · Global
Last reviewed:
Campaign overview
MITRE ATT&CK historical record. Dates reflect source observations. Current activity and target-region classification are not asserted; Global denotes unclassified catalogue coverage. ShadowRay was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers ShadowRay was the first known instance of AI workloads being activley exploited in the wild through vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure. CVE-2023-48022, which allows access to compute resources and sensitive data for exposed instances, remains unpatched and has been disputed by the vendor as they maintain that Ray is not intended for use outside of a strictly controlled network environment.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
This is a historical record and does not establish current campaign activity.
- Threat actor
- Not established
- Attribution confidence
- Not established
- First documented activity
- 2023-09-01
- End date
- Not established
- Estimated victims
- Not established
- Reported impact
- Not established
Unknown attribution, confidence and impact remain unspecified. Regional labels can include unspecified targets; assess the source evidence before acting.
Documented timeline
Source-reported first observation; not a claim of current activity or confirmed campaign start/end.
Source: MITRE ATT&CK
Source-reported last observation; not a claim of current activity or confirmed campaign start/end.
Source: MITRE ATT&CK
MITRE ATT&CK techniques
T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access — During ShadowRay, threat actors exploited CVE-2023-48022 on publicly exposed Ray servers to steal computing power and to expose sensitive data.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1027.013 · Encrypted/Encoded File
Stealth — During ShadowRay, threat actors used Base64-encrypted Python code to evade detection.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1003.008 · /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
Credential Access — During ShadowRay, threat actors used `cat /etc/shadow` to steal password hashes.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1546.004 · Unix Shell Configuration Modification
Privilege Escalation, Persistence — During ShadowRay, threat actors executed commands on interactive and reverse shells.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1588.002 · Tool
Resource Development — During ShadowRay, threat actors used tools including the XMRig miner and Interactsh.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer
Command And Control — During ShadowRay, threat actors downloaded and executed the XMRig miner on targeted hosts.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1059.006 · Python
Execution — During ShadowRay, threat actors used the Python `pty` module to open reverse shells.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
Discovery — During ShadowRay, threat actors invoked DNS queries from targeted machines to identify their IP addresses.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Privilege Escalation — During ShadowRay, threat actors downloaded a privilege escalation payload to gain root access.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
T1496.001 · Compute Hijacking
Impact — During ShadowRay, threat actors leveraged graphics processing units (GPU) on compromised nodes for cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: Oligo ShadowRay Campaign MAR 2024)
Linked indicators
0 reviewed indicators. An indicator’s presence does not establish that every resource on shared infrastructure is malicious.
No reviewed indicators are supplied. None are inferred from the campaign description.
Documented infrastructure
No reviewed infrastructure is supplied.
Sources and evidence
- MITRE ATT&CK C0045
Official MITRE ATT&CK campaign record C0045. Derived from mitre/cti commit 50be388e93819a5d20e71cbaaeccfda157abc846. Actor links and technique mappings are attributed to this source; confidence, victims, monetary impact and infrastructure are not inferred.
External sources retain their own licences and sharing conditions. Request a correction with supporting evidence.