Reviewed campaign intelligence
Frankenstein
Historical · OTHER · Global
Last reviewed:
Campaign overview
MITRE ATT&CK historical record. Dates reflect source observations. Current activity and target-region classification are not asserted; Global denotes unclassified catalogue coverage. Frankenstein was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including Empire. The campaign name refers to the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated open-source tool components.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
This is a historical record and does not establish current campaign activity.
- Threat actor
- Not established
- Attribution confidence
- Not established
- First documented activity
- 2019-01-01
- End date
- Not established
- Estimated victims
- Not established
- Reported impact
- Not established
Unknown attribution, confidence and impact remain unspecified. Regional labels can include unspecified targets; assess the source evidence before acting.
Documented timeline
Source-reported first observation; not a claim of current activity or confirmed campaign start/end.
Source: MITRE ATT&CK
Source-reported last observation; not a claim of current activity or confirmed campaign start/end.
Source: MITRE ATT&CK
MITRE ATT&CK techniques
T1057 · Process Discovery
Discovery — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain a list of all running processes.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1082 · System Information Discovery
Discovery — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain the compromised machine's name.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1027.010 · Command Obfuscation
Stealth — During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran encoded commands from the command line.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1020 · Automated Exfiltration
Exfiltration — During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which was automatically sent back to the adversary's C2.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation — During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: `/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR`, named "WinUpdate" (Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1204.002 · Malicious File
Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document likely sent via email.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1566.001 · Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access — During Frankenstein, the threat actors likely used spearphishing emails to send malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer
Command And Control — During Frankenstein, the threat actors downloaded files and tools onto a victim machine.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1059.001 · PowerShell
Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used PowerShell to run a series of Base64-encoded commands that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1518.001 · Security Software Discovery
Discovery — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to determine if analysis tools were running on a compromised system.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1059.005 · Visual Basic
Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Word documents that prompted the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1071.001 · Web Protocols
Command And Control — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used HTTP GET requests for C2.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1221 · Template Injection
Stealth — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used trojanized documents that retrieved remote templates from an adversary-controlled website.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1203 · Exploitation for Client Execution
Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors exploited CVE-2017-11882 to execute code on the victim's machine.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1059.003 · Windows Command Shell
Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named "WinUpdate", as well as other encoded commands from the command-line (Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1497.001 · System Checks
Stealth, Discovery — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script would stop execution.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running as well as to determine the operating system version.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1119 · Automated Collection
Collection — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1036.004 · Masquerade Task or Service
Stealth — During Frankenstein, the threat actors named a malicious scheduled task "WinUpdate" for persistence.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1005 · Data from Local System
Collection — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to gather various local system information.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration — During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary's C2.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1016 · System Network Configuration Discovery
Discovery — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to find the public IP address of a compromised system.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Stealth — During Frankenstein, the threat actors deobfuscated Base64-encoded commands following the execution of a malicious script, which revealed a small script designed to obtain an additional payload.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1588.002 · Tool
Resource Development — For Frankenstein, the threat actors obtained and used Empire.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1127.001 · MSBuild
Stealth, Execution — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
Discovery — During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to enumerate hosts and gather username, machine name, and administrative permissions information.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
T1573.001 · Symmetric Cryptography
Command And Control — During Frankenstein, the threat actors communicated with C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
Linked indicators
0 reviewed indicators. An indicator’s presence does not establish that every resource on shared infrastructure is malicious.
No reviewed indicators are supplied. None are inferred from the campaign description.
Documented infrastructure
No reviewed infrastructure is supplied.
Sources and evidence
- MITRE ATT&CK C0001
Official MITRE ATT&CK campaign record C0001. Derived from mitre/cti commit 50be388e93819a5d20e71cbaaeccfda157abc846. Actor links and technique mappings are attributed to this source; confidence, victims, monetary impact and infrastructure are not inferred.
External sources retain their own licences and sharing conditions. Request a correction with supporting evidence.